Reforming Local Election Boards to Strengthen Impartiality

This proposal offers an approach for how states that currently have local election boards with odd-numbered members, and that give the Governor’s party a majority on the boards, could switch to a more neutral structure while still allowing efficient decision making. This proposed alternative requires one of three board members to be a retired judge or local election official and makes that person the Chair of the board.

In a time when our democracy is under threat, this proposal would reduce the risk that partisan actors will tilt elections in their party’s favor, or be perceived as doing so by an increasingly wary electorate. The memo will discuss the proposal section-by-section, beginning with a description of the purpose of the board and the guiding principles animating the proposal, then how board members will be selected, then finally the service of the board members.‍

I. Reasons for Considering Reform

Local election boards are established to implement state law and do not have significant discretion over election procedures. However, they do make highly consequential decisions—including certification of election results and appointment of election staff, including the election director. Recent years have witnessed increasing instances of partisan friction impacting local boards’ roles in these areas, with some board members seemingly acting more in the interest of their political parties than the public in general.

Since 2020, local election officials in at least eight states have attempted to refuse to certify an election, such as the election board in Cochise County, Arizona, which only certified the 2022 election results under court order. Partisan members of local election boards have also used their power to pressure election officials to resign, seemingly with the goal of replacements more politically aligned with the board majority. In Lynchburg, Virginia, a local registrar claims she was terminated in 2023 for failing to echo the election board’s false claims of voter fraud. The registrar and her staff in Buckingham County, Virginia, quit for similar reasons that same year. Likewise, the election administrator in Tarrant County, Texas, resigned his post in 2023 due to tensions arising from efforts to curtail the transparency and neutrality of his office.

These examples highlight the danger that increasing polarization poses to the nonpartisan functioning of local election boards—which are the frontlines of our democracy.Of course, these examples in no way apply to all local election officials. Many registrars from diverse political backgrounds go to great lengths to demonstrate their neutrality and impartiality—including several who voluntarily abstain from voting in primary elections (or even general elections). Likewise, some states’ associations of electoral board members have recently established strong ethics standards for members to follow. Along with such instances of exemplary service, institutional reform is also needed. In a political environment often marked by a win-at-all-costs orientation, insulating local election boards and safeguarding their neutrality should be a priority for all.‍

II. Guiding Principles

The proposed legislation would begin by strengthening the purpose of the local election boards to make it clear they are meant to carry out their duties with service for all voters and neutrality toward all candidates, political parties, and political perspectives. The introductory section would make clear that the board members do not serve as representatives of any party or constituency but rather serve the public as a whole in the effort to ensure the fair and impartial administration of well-run elections. Accordingly, the legislation will require that, in addition to any oath required by the state constitution, all board members will swear an additional oath that includes an explicit commitment to neutrality.

III. Selection of Board Members

Board selection would be conducted as follows (this assumes a state that currently has three-member local boards, but could easily be modified to five members). One member would be nominated by the political party whose candidate received the most votes for governor in the last election. Another board member would be nominated by the political party whose candidate received the second-most votes for governor in the last election. Local party officials for each of these two political parties would each submit a list of three candidates to be considered for these two board member positions. There would be basic conflict-of-interest restrictions on who parties can nominate. For example, nominees cannot be related to another electoral board member or an elected official within the jurisdiction or have run for office within the jurisdiction themselves in the recent past.

As is currently the practice in Virginia, the chief judge of the judicial circuit for the relevant county or city (or that judge's designee) would review each party’s list and exercise their discretion to select one member from each list to serve on the board who they believe has the strongest qualifications to achieve the comportment of political neutrality required by the position.

The third board member would be the Chair of the board. To select the Chair, the county or city would solicit applications from retired judges and election officials. Any candidate must reside either in the jurisdiction or within a set distance from it. The same conflict of interest restrictions would apply to these candidates as apply to party nominees.[1]

There are two options for how the Chair would be selected from the applicant pool. Under the first option, the board members who were nominated by the two largest political parties would review the applicants. Together, they would be required to agree on one candidate; this person becomes the Chair of the board. The major party members would have a certain number of weeks to choose the Chair (we suggest two weeks as a default, but this could be raised or lowered as necessary). If they are not able to agree on one candidate by that date, the chief judge would randomly select one name from the applicant pool and that person would become the Chair of the board.

IV. Service of Board

Board members would retain their current term length and limits, three-year staggered terms in the case of Virginia. The Secretary position would be held by the major party nominee from the same party as the Governor. If the party of the Governor changes in the middle of the Board’s term, the Secretary position would change as well.

Board members would be allowed to serve an unlimited number of terms, but they would be required to be re-appointed / re-selected through the process each time anew. Finally, any vacancy would be filled using the same procedures that were used to select the member whose seat has become vacant. A replacement for the Chair would be selected from the same applicant pool as the original Chair. All replacements would serve for the unexpired term of the member whose seat has become vacant. We believe that this proposal will ensure that local election boards run impartial and fair elections, while minimizing disruption to existing standards, norms, and structures so that the proposal remains politically viable.

V. Timing of Implementation

This reform could be implemented with a delay to reduce the impact of near-term political expectations. For example, if used in Virginia, where a gubernatorial election will take place this year, implementation could be delayed until 2030, after the next gubernatorial election.

[1] There is a possibility that this will not be a large enough pool to provide a reasonable number of applications. If this is a concern, the pool could also include individuals who formerly or currently hold / held a volunteer position in election administration for at least two election cycles. This would allow regular poll workers to apply as well.