Options for Local Election Board Reform

Context

Approximately one-third of states give substantial authority over elections to local election boards, which are almost entirely composed of political party appointees. In an era of increasing polarization and election-related disputes, the party-based structure of these boards is creating risks to fair and trusted election functioning. This brief summarizes these problems and proposes a practical solution.

In 12 states, local election boards operate across all jurisdictions, while in three states, boards are established only in the most populous cities and counties. Board responsibilities vary: most certify election results and observe recounts; other roles can include appointing local election officials and ruling on provisional ballots.

Nearly all boards are composed only of individuals nominated by the two largest political parties. Typically, the major parties nominate short lists of candidates who are then appointed to the board by the competent authority, such as a judge, county commission, or state board. The one exception is Oklahoma, which has three-member boards, one nominated by each major party and the third person, who serves as secretary, selected by the state election board. There is no statutory requirement regarding the political party affiliation, or lack thereof, of the board secretary. The secretary performs many election administrative functions.

Five states have boards with an even number of members, to create partisan parity. Deadlock can be an issue in this structure, and in one state, Ohio, the Secretary of State casts a deciding vote to address that problem. The other ten states have odd-numbered boards that give a majority to one party. Typically, the majority of the board goes to the party of the governor or other state official, or the party controlling the state legislature.

The following table provides a summary.

Problems with Partisan Local Election Boards

In an era of increasing polarization, the party-based structure of these boards has given rise to developments that undermine fair and trusted election functioning. These include:

• ‍Refusal to certify results

• Politically motivated firing of election officials

• ‍Dissemination of false information about election systems

• Inappropriate coordination with partisan poll watcher groups

Generally, these situations have been addressed through hearings or other actions, typically led by the state election board, that have prevented significant impact on elections. But they can contribute to public doubt and contention around elections.

Some states have experienced significant turnover in board membership as party control of all boards has changed back and forth through election cycles, necessitating replacement of many members. In Virginia, all 133 local electoral boards have changed party control five times in the last 24 years, with each change requiring replacement of one member of every board. These transitions undermine the experience base of the boards and increase training requirements and expense.

An additional concern is that a growing plurality of Americans is no longer affiliated with either party, reducing the degree to which boards composed entirely of major party nominees can be said to represent most of the electorate. A comparative international perspective reveals that partisan leadership in election management is very uncommon among democracies. A 2014 study by Elections Canada found that “The basic arrangement in the US of having politically connected individuals serving on a commission that makes decisions about the interpretation and enforcement of electoral law would be seen as unusual, if not inappropriate, by most knowledgeable observers…” The report cites that in “countries where a commission model exists, steps have been taken to provide distance from the political and partisan processes of campaigning and governing.”

A Practical Solution

A path toward reform can start with two framing premises: First, party involvement is too well established for it to make sense practically or politically to entirely remove party nomination of some members. Second, for odd-numbered boards (usually 3 or 5 members) the last seat creates an opportunity. That seat could be designed to meet specific qualifications and the process of filling that seat can involve consultation by the parties but not control by either. Lastly, the final decision on filling the last seat should not be made locally (given the political imbalance in most states created by a large number of small Republican jurisdictions and a small number of large Democratic ones). Instead, a state election board is a good candidate for that appointment role. Those principles can lead to a process such as the following:

• The two largest parties nominate board members following existing processes to fill two seats of a three-person board, or four seats of a five-person board.

• The state’s election board announces openings for the 3^rd or 5^th seat and receives applications.

• Criteria could include election expertise; non-affiliated status (in states with party-based registration); and no prior background as a political candidate, party official, campaign staff person, lobbyist, or political consultant.

• Staff of the state election board would review applications, and shortlist best candidates.

• The party-nominated members of the local board would review the list, conduct interviews, and try to agree on a selection.

• If they fail, the member would be selected at random from the names on the shortlist.

Conclusion

Changing local boards to include a tie-breaking, independent member selected for their election expertise represents a precedent-setting change that could improve board functionality, reduce risks of partisan manipulation, and increase voter trust. This structure preserves party representation while ensuring that technical competence and political independence are also incorporated in board design. This approach avoids the potential for deadlock on even-numbered boards, while also avoiding the dramatic swings in party control that occur on odd-numbered boards with the majority decided by state election outcomes.

At a time when most Americans are tired of political feuds and eager for calm reliability in core systems like elections, supporting this innovation represents an opportunity for political leadership. The reform has no impact on either party’s election prospects, instead offering a path to election stability and an example of national leadership.